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POUND FOOLISH: CHALLENGING
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE
U.S. AND THE U.K.
“It’s good to be the king.”1
I. INTRODUCTION

A

stronomical executive pay has been referred to as “the
th
most egregious governance failure of the 20 century.”2
Although excessive executive remuneration has long been a
newsworthy topic in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), beginning in
the early and mid-1990s “interest in the topic reached unprecedented levels.”3 There were several reasons for this piqued interest in the salaries of the country’s executives. For one, the
“gross pay of chief executives in larger U.K. public companies
rose nearly 600% between 1979 and 1994.”4 In addition, “remuneration levels seemed to bear little relation to corporate performance.”5 Finally, as corporations were increasing their executives’ pay, they were also cutting back on rank and file employee positions.6 Although executive pay was a hot topic in the
United States (“U.S.”) throughout the 1990s, it didn’t reach its
pinnacle until early 2001.7 This was mainly due to the thriving
U.S. economy — investors and shareholders were “too optimistic about their personal economic future to be very concerned
about executives getting rich.”8 However, with the economic
slowdown beginning in early 2001, and the recent corporate
scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco, good corporate
governance is now on the radar screen of most shareholders.9

1. History of the World Part I (Twentieth Century Fox 1981).
2. Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards, How the Corporate Scandals
are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 7, 2002, at 108.
3. Brian R. Cheffins & Randall Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a
Greater Say over Executive Pay?: Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 277, 278 (2001). For a general discussion, see id. at 278–82.
4. Id. at 279.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 298–99.
8. Id. at 279.
9. Id. at 299. See also Jerry Useem, Have They No Shame?, FORTUNE,
Apr. 28, 2003, at 59; Andrew Hill & Caroline Daniel, U.S. Investors Are Grow-

File: Jackie2.20.04.doc

748

Created on: 2/20/2004 7:31 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:35 PM

[Vol. 29:2

Essentially, within the realm of corporate governance topics,
executive pay has preoccupied investors the most. Indeed, in
2003 “[e]xecutive pay ha[d] taken over as the top concern of corporate governance from last year’s biggest worry, the independence of auditors.”10 “Yet although executive compensation was
one of the first targets that critics of corporate America attacked after the spate of scandals [in 2002], it is still proving
the toughest to reform.”11
This Note analyzes the issue of executive compensation
through a comparison of the U.S. and the U.K., with a focus on
the rights and responsibilities of shareholders in challenging
executive pay. Part II compares the U.S. and U.K. systems of
corporate governance, including corporate structure, composition of share ownership and corporate governance laws in both
countries. Part III examines whether executive compensation
is excessive. Part IV discusses the details of setting compensation and the related disclosure regimes in the U.K. and the U.S.
In particular, it examines the methods by which executives are
paid and sets out the laws regulating the setting of compensation in both countries. Part V addresses the issue of how
shareholders can challenge executive compensation, with a focus on challenges through voting. Specifically, this section discusses challenges by shareholder proposals, challenges to share
option plans, and challenges at the annual meeting. Part VI
focuses on recent amendments to the U.K. Companies Act and
to the New York Stock Exchange listing rules. Finally, Part VII
discusses shareholder responsibilities and stresses the need for
greater shareholder involvement in the compensation process.
II. COMPARING THE U.S. AND U.K. SYSTEMS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
There are many similarities between the corporate sectors of
the U.S. and the U.K.. Both systems are “characterized by a
relatively large number of quoted companies, a liquid capital
market where ownership and control rights are traded fre-

ing Restive Over Lavish Boardroom Pay, But Will They Fall Quiet Once the
Bear Market Recedes, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 9.
10. Fat Cats Feeding, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 64.
11. Hill & Daniel, supra note 9, at 9.
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quently, and few inter-corporate holdings.”12 In other words,
both systems have capital markets and wide dispersal of ownership.13 Since dispersed ownership is found in both the U.S. and
the U.K., “[t]he U.S. is…a particularly important country
against which to compare U.K. governance because unlike Continental Europe and most of the rest of the world, the underlying structure of its capital markets and companies is similar.”14
A. Corporate Structure in the U.S. and U.K.
At the outset, it is important to note some specific similarities
between corporate structure in the U.S. and U.K. Both the U.S.
and the U.K. “have a ‘shareholder economy’ where private enterprise is about maximizing profits for those who invest.”15 As
a result, “shareholders occupy the central position with respect
to companies.”16 The system of ownership and control in both
countries has been called an “outsider/arm’s-length” system.17
“Outsider” refers to the fact that most firms do not have a “core”
group of shareholders with “inside” influence, but rather have
dispersed ownership “among a large number of institutional
and individual investors rather than being concentrated in the
hands of family owners, banks or affiliated firms.”18 The term
“arm’s-length” is used to describe the fact that investors “are
rarely poised to intervene and take a hand in running a business.”19 Essentially, this role is left to the corporate executives.20
Since the U.S. has a common law legal system and marketbased economy, the main form of corporation in the U.S. is the
publicly-held company with widely-dispersed ownership. This
creates an agency problem between the shareholders, who own
12. G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 3 (1996).
13. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Governance as a Source of Managerial Discipline, 2, Apr. 10, 2000 (prepared for the Company Law Review,
Committee E on Corporate Governance), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/
cld/franksreport.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 297.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 297–98.
18. Id. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around
the World, 54 J. OF FIN. 471 (1999).
19. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 298.
20. Id.
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the company, and the executives and directors, who manage the
company.21
Each of the fifty U.S. states has its own business corporations
law and each corporation is governed by the law of the state of
its incorporation.22 Each corporation draws up articles of incorporation setting out the duties and rights of shareholders and
directors.23 The shareholders, being owners of the corporation,
are given certain rights, including the right to vote, such as voting for the board of directors.24 The board, in turn, chooses executives to run the day-to-day operations of the firm and set
dividends.25 Often, in the U.S., the positions of chairman of the
board of directors and chief executive officer are held by one
person.26
The U.K.’s corporate structure is similar to that of the U.S.
At least part of the U.K.’s corporate governance system has
been shaped by “its political and social history and attitudes.”27
It has been suggested that the fact that the U.K. is an island
has led to its “[i]nsularity” which “has bequeathed the U.K. a
sense of welcome separateness which no amount of foreign entanglement can destroy.”28
The general model of corporate management and control in
the U.K. involves “two main organs: the board of directors and
the general meeting of members.”29 Pursuant to a company’s
articles of association, the board may “appoint and confer any of
their powers upon one or more executive (or ‘managing’) direc-

21. See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542–43 (2000).
22. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 174 (1994).
23. See GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE COUNSEL
14–15 (American Bar Association, 1996).
24. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Director’s Selection, §1.01, at 1–2 (The Michie Company, 1993) (“Most central to shareholders’
role then is their power to elect directors, and statutes typically refer to that
shareholder power expressly.”). See also CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 182.
25. See CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 183, 194–96.
26. Who’s in Charge?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2003, at 20.
27. CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 249. See generally Roe, supra note 21.
28. CHARKHAM, supra note 22, at 250.
29. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 6.
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tors, which in effect allows the creation of a third organ –—
executive management.”30
Essentially, “the board of directors is the most important dayto-day organ in the company.”31 The board of directors has “the
power to manage the business of the company, and the general
meeting is not permitted to interfere with its exercise.”32 However, this does not mean that the annual general meeting
(“AGM”) (analogous to the “annual meeting” in the U.S.) is
without purpose. At the AGM, the shareholders may remove
directors without cause by vote, which requires a simple majority.33 In addition, shareholders may vote at the general meeting
to alter the articles of association, which requires a threequarters super-majority.34 The board of a typical public company in the U.K. is comprised of both non-executive directors
and executive directors.35 The board, as a whole, does not typically manage the day-to-day operations of the company; rather,
the board delegates these duties to the chief executive (also
called the “managing director”) and other executive directors.36
Unlike in the U.S., the roles of chairman and chief executive are
generally separated.37 The executive management of the company, which consists of executive directors and executive officers (who are not members of the board), plan the company’s
30. Id.
31. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 6–7.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 303 (Eng.).
34. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 9.
35. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7. Although this is not a requirement
under U.K. law, the Combined Code suggests that the board have an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive directors (including independent non-executives) so that no individual or group of individuals can dominate
the board’s decision making. See Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules,
§ 1, paras. B1–B3, Schedules A, B (June 1998). See also DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY (“DTI”), CONSULTATION PAPER, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (June 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Higgs Report].
36. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7.
37. Who’s in Charge?, supra note 26, at 20. See also Press Release, Pensions Investment Research Consultants, Companies Face Increasing Risks By
Ignoring Shareholders’ Views On Corporate Governance (Dec. 2003), available
at http://www.pirc.co.uk/Annual_review_2003.pdf [hereinafter PIRC] (approximately 10% of companies have a combined chairman and chief executive).
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strategy.38 However, “it is normally necessary for the approval
of the board to be obtained for major transactions or changes in
strategy, and [it is] sometimes necessary for shareholder approval to be obtained as well.”39 In an average company, the
board of directors will meet monthly to discuss strategy and to
monitor the performance of executive management.40 The board
of directors and senior executives owe a fiduciary duty to the
“company as a legal entity separate from its shareholders and
creditors.”41 However, directors also have the duty, when making decisions, to consider the interests of the company’s employees (stakeholders).42
The right to vote is common in most ordinary shares of publicly listed companies in the U.K.43 Most of the publicly listed
U.K. companies “have only one class of ordinary shares, with
each ordinary share carrying one vote on a poll at a general
meeting of the company.”44 Similar to the U.S. system, the articles of association of the U.K. company will set out this oneshare, one-vote system. There are two types of general meetings where shareholders exercise their right to vote: the AGM
and the extraordinary general meetings (“EGM”). The matters
upon which shareholders are required to vote are set out in the
Companies Act of 1985, the company’s articles of association,
the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the general law.45
Some examples of matters on which shareholders have a right
to vote include: changes to the articles of association,46 the company and purchase of its own shares,47 removal of directors,48

38. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 7.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 309.
43. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 82.
44. Id. See also Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 370(6) (there is a presumption
of one vote per share on a poll and non-voting and restricted-voting shares do
exist, but are not common).
45. See STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 82. See also Cheffins & Thomas,
supra note 3, at 287.
46. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 4, 9 & 17.
47. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, §§ 164 & 166.
48. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 303.
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transactions between the company and someone related to the
company49 and a voluntary winding up of the company.50
B. Composition of Share Ownership in the U.K.
According to the most recent U.K. government survey of
share ownership on the U.K. Stock Exchange, released in July
2003, overseas/foreign investors account for 32.1% of U.K. equity; individuals account for 14.3%;51 banks accounts for 2.1%;
and insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional shareholders account for 49.4%.52 Therefore, in the U.K.,
institutional shareholders hold a sweeping majority of equity
capital of publicly-listed companies.53 Despite such a large percentage of equity ownership in public companies, institutional
shareholders (e.g., pension fund trustees) are not required to
exercise their vote.54
The market where most publicly listed stocks are traded in
the U.K. is the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”).55 The LSE is
one of Europe’s leading exchanges and consists of both domestic
and international companies. Although the LSE has been in
existence for approximately 200 years, in 1986 it experienced
what is considered the “Big Bang” — when the market truly
opened its doors and grew exponentially. Currently, the LSE
49. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.).
50. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 84(1) (Eng.).
51. The proportionate share ownership of individuals has decreased steadily in the U.K. In 1963, approximately 54% of U.K. equities were held by individuals while in 1998, the figure dropped to a mere 16.5%. See Geof Stapledon, Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in U.K., at 4, at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/staple.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2004). Stapledon
attributes this decline to “the growing proportionate holding of the institutions, and…individuals swapping their money from directly held shares to
indirect investment in equities via investments in unit trusts, investment
trusts and pension funds.” Id.
52. Press Release, Office of National Statistics, Share Ownership 2002,
July 18, 2003, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/sha0703.pdf.
53. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 4. Since the early 1960s, institutional
investor equity holdings in public companies has increased significantly. In
1963, individuals owned approximately 54% and institutional investors owned
29%. However, in 1994, individuals owned a mere 20% and institutional investors owned approximately 60%. Id. at 4–5.
54. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 85.
55. Information about the LSE is available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com.
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has about 2,700 companies which trade on its markets (the
main market56 has more than 2000 companies, with approximately 400 international issuers, and the secondary AIM market57 has more than 700 companies with approximately 50 overseas issuers)58 for a market value of approximately £3 trillion (or
$5.49 trillion U.S. dollars).59
C. Corporate Governance Law in the U.S. and U.K.
Before delving into the specifics of corporate governance law
in both countries, it is important to note that the U.S. and U.K.
have a “shared legal heritage encompassing the common law
and principles of equity.”60
In the U.S., corporate governance is monitored through a
combination of state and federal statutes, SEC rules (regarding
disclosures, proxies, and proposals), and common law. Generally speaking, the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to the
corporation to act in the corporation’s best interest. This means
that directors are prohibited from self-dealing and from using
corporate control for their own financial gain (i.e., insider trading). Common law governs subjects such as conflicts of interest,
fiduciary duties, self-dealing, business judgment, and waste.
Much like the U.S., the U.K. is a common law country with its
corporate governance law comprised of an amalgamation of different sources: Codes (mainly voluntary), the Companies Act of
1985, the Stock Exchange Listing Rules, and common law.
56. Within the main market there are special groupings for certain sectors
including techMARK (an international market for innovative technology companies), techMARK Mediscience (for healthcare companies), and landMARK
(for U.K. regional companies). See London Stock Exchange website, at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
57. The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a market for growing
companies and has only been around since 1995. See London Stock Exchange
website, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
58. Despite the fact that about 85% of the 2,700 companies listed on the
Exchange are U.K. companies, approximately 61% of the LSE’s equity market
value derives from international companies. This is most likely because the
foreign companies which choose to trade on the LSE are comparably large.
See London Stock Exchange website, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
59. As of the time of publication, the exchange rate is £1 to $1.86 (Feb. 9,
2004).
60. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 297.
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There are four corporate governance codes in the U.K., which
act as “self-regulatory controls and [are] enforceable only
through shareholder pressure and the Stock Exchange Listing
Rules.”61 The Cadbury Code, issued in 1992, was the first such
code promulgated in the U.K.62 The Code recognized the importance of corporate governance to the U.K.’s competitive economy63 and recommended a “Code of Best Practice,”64 which focused mainly on “openness, integrity and accountability.”65 This
Code of Best Practice included nineteen recommendations relating to the board of directors, non-executive directors, executive
directors, and auditors.66 For purposes of remuneration, it is
important to note that the Cadbury Report suggested that
shareholders be given a vote on directors’ service contracts and
that there be full and clear disclosure of the salaries of directors
and executives.67 In addition, the Cadbury Code recommended
that publicly listed corporations have remuneration committees
comprised of non-executive directors.68
In 1995, a second code, named the Greenbury Code, was issued by the Greenbury Committee, focusing solely on managerial remuneration.69 The Code focused on increased disclosure
of compensation, especially in annual reports to shareholders.70
Similar to the preceding Cadbury Code, the Greenbury Code
also suggested that remuneration committees for publicly listed

61. Jacqueline Cook & Simon Deakin, Empirical Evidence on Corporate
Control, in LITERATURE SURVEY ON FACTUAL, EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ch.
10, at 1 (1999).
62. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (chaired
by Sir Adrian Cadbury), REPORT (1992) [hereinafter Cadbury Code].
63. Id. at para. 1.1.
64. Id. at paras. 3.1–3.16.
65. Id. at para. 3.2.
66. Id. at paras. 3.1–3.16.
67. Id. at para. 4.40.
68. Id. at para. 4.42.
69. DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR
RICHARD GREENBURY (1995) [hereinafter GREENBURY REPORT]. “The Greenbury Committee was set up on the initiative of the Confederation of British
Industry in reaction to controversies surrounding increases in managerial
remuneration, especially in privatized utilities, and in an attempt to pre-empt
government action to deal with executive pay.” Cook & Deakin, supra note
61, at ch. 10, at 1.
70. GREENBURY REPORT, supra note 69, at B1–B12.
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corporations consist of non-executive directors.71 It went further
to suggest that shareholders should have direct access to the
chairman of the company’s remuneration committee at the annual meeting.72
In 1998, the Hampel Report was published, restating, many
of the same corporate governance concerns.73 The Report
stressed the end of the “box ticking” approach to corporate governance74 — the drafters of the Report did not want U.K. companies to merely look down a list of good corporate governance
practices and check them off as they accomplished them. In
other words, the Report aimed for corporate governance as a
means (to a competitive international economy in the U.K.), not
as an end in itself.75 The Report developed a set of principles, as
opposed to the guidelines which the preceding codes had delineated.76 According to Hampel, the single overriding objective of
all listed companies should be to enhance shareholder wealth.
The Report, however, was met with a mixed reaction since it
left open many questions, such as “What is a principle, and
what is a rule?” and “What will companies have to comply
with?”77
The Combined Code, which followed the Hampel Report and
is known as the Code of Codes, is essentially a combination of
all three voluntary codes.78 It adopted the principles set out in
the Hampel Report and covered all issues of corporate governance including, board issues, remuneration, the role of the
71. Id. at A1, A4.
72. Id. at A8.
73. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (London, Gee Publishing, 1998) [hereinafter HAMPEL
REPORT].
74. The “box-ticking” approach refers to a corporate practice by which
“shareholders are only interested in whether the letter of the rule ha[s] been
complied with.” See HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 73, at paras. 1.11–1.14. See
also Unpacking Hampel, The Committee’s Preliminary Report, INTELLIGENCE
(July/Aug. 1997).
75. HAMPEL REPORT, supra note 73, at para. 1.21.
76. Id. at paras. 2.1-2.2.
77. See Unpacking Hampel, supra note 74 (also stating that “one auditor
told the Financial Times, ‘it’s all pretty confusing.’”).
78. The Combined Code is included in the appendix to the Listing Rules,
which are administered by the U.K. Financial Services Authority in its capacity as the U.K. Listing Authority (“UKLA”). See Financial Services Authority,
Listing Rules, § 1, paras. B1–B3, Schedules A, B (June 1998).
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shareholders, financial reporting, auditing and transparency.
The Combined Code is unique among its predecessors, whereas
the other codes were voluntary, it is made mandatory to publicly listed companies by Rule 12.43A of the Listing Rules for
the LSE. Although it technically has the force of law, a company may choose not to comply with the Combined Code, which
is conditioned on the company explaining the reasons for its
noncompliance — often called “comply or explain.” Unfortunately, “in many cases the companies’ explanations for noncompliance are either weak or non-existent.”79 In addition,
“while compliance has improved [since the Code was promulgated], only around one in three listed companies (34%) fully
complies with the existing Combined Code.” 80 Therefore, despite the fact that the Combined Code leads to greater transparency of corporate governance practices, it loses some of its
“bite” since a company still has a choice not to comply as long as
it justifies its reasons.81 Recently, the Code was amended to
incorporate recommendations regarding non-executive directors
and audit committees.82
In January 2003, a report entitled “Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors” was published by a
committee led by Derek Higgs.83 This report is more widely
known as the Higgs Review or the Higgs Report. The review
focused on issues such as the role of non-executive directors,
attracting and recruiting non-executive directors, the ways in
which the effective performance of non-executive directors could
be enhanced and the relationship between shareholders and

79. PIRC, supra note 37.
80. Id.
81. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, pmbl., paras. 3–5 (June
1998).
82. The new Combined Code was published by the Financial Reporting
Council on July 23, 2003.
83. See Higgs Report, supra note 35. It should be noted that on the same
day, the Smith Report was also published, which clarified and expanded the
roles and responsibilities of audit committees. Clearly, the Smith Report was
a “response to issues raised by the major corporate failures in 2002.” Michael
Hammill, Corporate Governance — Proposed Changes in the U.K., INT’L
COMPANY & COMM. L. REV., 2003, 14(9), N102-104, at N102 (also summarizing
the main key recommendations of the Smith Report). While noteworthy, the
Smith Report is beyond the scope of this Note.
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non-executive directors.84 The report made proposals with regard to each of these topics, including a proposal that quoted
company boards should be comprised of a majority of nonexecutive directors and only these non-executive directors
should comprise the remuneration board.85 In general, the report “envisages a more demanding and important role for nonexecutive directors.”86 Higgs was generally met with favorable
reviews, which included an endorsement from Patricia Hewitt,
Secretary of State of the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (hereinafter “DTI”).87 The Higgs Report was incorporated
into the amended Combined Code in July 2003.88
Indeed, the DTI has been very active in making recommendations to the U.K. government regarding directors’ remuneration. The DTI has published three consultative documents and
has made many noteworthy proposals to the U.K. government
to enhance corporate governance in the area of executive pay.89
In July 1999, the DTI published its first consultative document on the topic of directors’ remuneration.90 In its foreword,
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry noted the importance of British companies offering remuneration packages that
attracted the “best executives to run their businesses” while
simultaneously linking pay to performance.91 This document
focused principally on the following issues: 1) the independence
and effectiveness of the board’s remuneration committee; 2) the
way in which rewards are linked to performance to encourage
enhanced performance by directors; 3) companies’ reporting to

84. See Higgs Report, supra note 35, at 5–10 (Summary of Recommendations).
85. Id.
86. Hammill, supra note 83, at N102 (summing up the main key recommendations of the Higgs Report).
87. Press Release, DTI and Her Majesty’s Treasury, Government Welcomes Reports on the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors and
on Audit Committees (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk. But
see Alistair Alcock, Higgs — The Wrong Answer, COMP. L. 24(6), 161 (2003)
(arguing that the Higgs proposals will lead to increased domination of the
CEO).
88. Alcock, supra note 87, at 161.
89. See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text.
90. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July
1999).
91. See id. at Foreword.
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shareholders of their general policy on executive remuneration,
particularly with regard to linkage to performance; 4) compensation payments to directors on loss of office; and 5) the board’s
accountability to shareholders on remuneration policy.92 DTI
recommended that all quoted companies should have a remuneration committee composed of independent non-executive directors, that executive pay should be linked to performance, and
that the disclosure for individual directors’ remuneration
should be simplified for easier comprehension.93 In addition, the
DTI recommended strengthening the disclosure provisions on
service contracts and compensation arrangements improving
accountability by requiring quoted companies to ask shareholders to vote on the board’s remuneration every year, as well as
voting on its remuneration policy.94 Other proposals included
requiring directors of quoted companies and the chairman of
the remuneration committee to stand for election or re-election
every year and for the creation of special procedures by which
shareholders could move a remuneration resolution at the
AGM.95
In December 2001, the DTI published its second consultative
document on executive pay.96 This document recommended that
companies: (1) publish a report on directors’ remuneration as
part of the company’s annual reporting cycle; (2) disclose within
the report details of individual directors’ remuneration packages, remuneration policy, the remuneration committee, the
policy on the duration of directors’ contracts, and the payments
made upon severance; (3) display a line graph showing company
performance; and (4) put an annual resolution to shareholders
on the remuneration report.97
In June 2003, the DTI published a third consultative document on directors’ remuneration, entitled “‘Rewards for Failure’
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at ch. 1, para. 1.2.
See id.
See id. at paras. 5.10–5.11, 6.12–6.13.
See id. at paras. 7.17–7.23.
See generally DTI, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (Dec. 2001).
97. Id. at para. 1.1. This proposal became law when the U.K. Parliament
passed an amendment to the U.K. Companies Act, which went into effect on
August 1, 2002. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI
2002/1986, §§ 3, 7–9.
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Directors’ Remuneration — Contracts, Performance and Severance” which focused mainly on severance payments to directors.98 Patricia Hewitt, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, stated in the foreword to this document that the “increase in the level of shareholder activism on the issue of directors’ remuneration…is very much a result of the new requirements on disclosure and a shareholder vote which the Government has introduced.”99 Despite progress, DTI recognized that
further reforms were necessary. For example, they made the
following suggestions: (1) amending the Companies Act of 1985
to require compensation payments to be fair and reasonable100
and (2) amending section 319 of the Companies Act of 1985 to
reduce the statutory contract period.101 The U.K. government
should soon be responding to this latest consultative document
by announcing how it proposes to proceed.102

98. See DTI, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, “REWARDS FOR FAILURE” DIRECTORS’
REMUNERATION – CONTRACTS, PERFORMANCE AND SEVERANCE (June 2003),
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/published.htm [hereinafter REWARDS
FOR FAILURE].
99. Id.
100. A bill entitled “Company Directors’ Performance and Compensation,”
published on December 11, 2002 and now withdrawn, was introduced by
Archie Norman in Parliament and suggested the insertion of a new section
316A into the Companies Act of 1985. This new section would require that
upon a director’s termination from office or employment, the amount of compensation paid to such director should be “fair and reasonable having regard
to any failure by the director in the performance of his duties either in his
office as director or as an employee or both.” The full text of the bill is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/022/2003
022.htm. For a brief discussion of the proposed bill, entitled the “Company
Directors’ Performance and Compensation Bill,” see Mike Woodley, Big Rewards for Big Failures, COMPANY L. 2003, 24(8), 247–48 (2003).
101. Currently, § 319 allows companies to enter into contracts with executives in excess of five years if shareholders give their approval. See Companies Act 1985, § 319. The DTI proposes lessening this five year period to three
years. See REWARDS FOR FAILURE, supra note 98, at paras. 3.16–3.20.
102. The consultation period, during which commentary on the report is
received, closed on September 30, 2003. The next step is for the U.K. government to publish a summary of the responses and announce its own actions.
See Hammill, supra note 83, at N122.
Hammill has noted that
“[c]ommentaries on the Consultative Document and responses published to
date show a polarization of opinions.” Id.
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III. IS EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXCESSIVE?
Before embarking on a discussion regarding how shareholders can “fix” the problem of excessive executive compensation,
the question must first be asked: Are executives being paid too
much?103
There are two classes of people arguing the issue of executive
compensation: those who believe that executive compensation is
excessive and those who do not.104 Those who believe that executives are overpaid argue that there is little relationship between executive compensation and executive performance.105
Indeed, “pay for performance” has caustically been referred to
as “pay-for-attendance.”106 This group argues that the substantial pay differential between executives and rank and file employees (especially in the U.S.) is a justification for lowering
executive compensation.107 Indeed, the pay differential between
executives and rank and file employees is spiraling out of control.108 For example, in 1980, executives in the U.S. earned approximately 40 times that of the average production worker.109
This figure rose to 85 in 1990, and today it is approximated that
executives earn about 400 times more than the average production workers.110 Recently, the chairman of the Catholic Funds, a

103. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (“No serious consideration of solutions to the
‘problem’ of executive compensation should proceed before determining
whether, in fact, CEOs are overpaid.”).
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. For example, executives of utility companies in the U.K., that were
privatized under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government, were
awarded substantial increases in pay despite the fact that profits were a result of “privileged access to markets” and not executive performance. Cheffins
& Thomas, supra note 3, at 279.
106. Useem, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Matt Ward, an independent pay
consultant).
107. Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More than Your Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 63, 64–65
(2001) [hereinafter My Executive Makes More than Your Executive].
108. See Gretchen Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So
Much, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, sec. 3 at 1.
109. Where’s the Stick? Carrots, Sticks and Bosses’ Pay, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11,
2003, at 13.
110. Id. A study conducted in 2000 by Towers Perrin found that the pay
differential between CEOs and lower-level employees was closer to 531 to 1.
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$30 million fund company in Milwaukee, submitted a proposal
to seven companies which would limit CEO pay to a figure that
is 100 times that of the average worker.111 As of 2000, in the
U.K., it was estimated that executives earned only twenty-five
times more112 than rank and file employees.113 “According to a
recent Incomes Data Services report, the total earnings of FTSE
100 chief executives rose 89% in the five years [leading up] to
2001, while full-time employees received a 28.7% rise.”114
Those who argue that executive pay is not excessive suggest
that a “free market fixes compensation.”115 In other words, this
group believes that executive compensation can be rationalized
due to the combination of a “large pool of potential executives,”
“companies bidding for their services,” and a “wealth of information available about compensation.”116 Others argue that it
would be too difficult to link executive pay to performance because the company cannot “distinguish between those achievements stemming from the CEO’s contribution versus those that
are a result of favorable economic conditions or other factors.”117
In the same vein, it is too difficult to link the success or failure
Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, supra note
108, at sec. 3 at 1.
111. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much,
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1. The seven companies included Cendant, Compuware, Delta Air Lines, the El Paso Corporation, International Paper, Sun
Microsystems, and Viacom. The SEC must determine whether the proposal
will be allowed to be included in the companies’ proxy materials. Id.
112. Another study has stated that the pay differential in the U.K. is closer
to 20 to one. See Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 279.
113. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much,
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1. The study was conducted by Towers Perrin in
2000. It also found that in Brazil the pay gap is 57 to 1; in Mexico it is 45 to 1;
in Canada it is 21 to 1; in France it is 16 to 1; in Germany, it is 11 to 1; and in
Japan, it is approximately 10 to 1. Id.
114. Julia Finch & Jill Treanor, Executive Pay Leaps Ahead 17%, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 4, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/executivepay/story/0,12
04,804389,00.html.
115. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 2.
116. Id. Cf. Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138 (1995) (arguing that the pay-for-performance method of compensation is inadequate to
address the concerns of excessive compensation and that the courts should
focus on equity ownership as a solution).
117. See Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much,
supra note 108, at sec. 3 at 1.
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of a corporation to the performance of one individual.118 Some
among this group believe that executive compensation is not a
matter for public debate — it is simply “a matter for the company and shareholders.”119 Indeed, “by and large, [even] governments are reluctant to intervene in the private matter of
employment contracts.”120 Yet, there is substantial commentary
and evidence finding that the market for executives is simply
inefficient.121 This has come to be known as the Lake Woebegon
effect — taking its title from the novel by Garrison Keillor entitled “Lake Woebegon Days,” wherein all of the children in Lake
Woebegon are “above average.”122 A market has developed for
corporate executives in which all executives are considered
“above average” and, consequently are paid at “above average”
prices — thus causing “bosses’ pay to spiral[] upwards.”123 CEO
pay has ratcheted upward because “[n]o [executive] selection
committee wants to award their new [executive] less than the
industry average.”124 Others have referred to the free-market
system for corporate executives as “the Golden Rule gone
wrong, CEOs do unto others as they would have [the executives]
do unto them.”125 Further adding to the Lake Woebegon effect is
the globalization of the market for executives.126 With the market for executives becoming increasingly global (in 2002, a
study found that 10% of CEOs on the FTSE 100 were non118. Id.
119. Saleem Sheikh, The Greenbury Report: Fond Hope, Faint Promise, 10
(11) J. INT’L BUS. L. 471 (1995).
120. Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 64.
121. See Bosses for Sale, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 57 (suggesting that the
market for executives is secretive, restricted, bad at price-settings and generally run by the head hunter firms). See also Where’s the Stick?, supra note
109, at 13; Useem, supra note 9, at 58.
122. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109, at 13.
123. Id.
124. Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 66.
125. Useem, supra note 9, at 64 (quoting Harvard Business School Professor
Rakesh Khurana).
126. Therese Raphael, Hunting Fat Cats, Shooting Wild, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), June 26, 2002, at A9 (stating that the global market for executives
has increased executive pay in the U.K.). See also Evelina Shmukler, HBOS
Girds to Approve Executive-Pay Schemes, WALL ST. J. (Europe), May 14, 2002,
at M6 (stating that since the market for executives is international, U.K.
banks must increase salaries to attract executive talent and “keep up with the
compensation offered across the ocean”).
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British),127 countries must increase salaries in order to attract
talented executives.128
There are also those that agree that compensation is substantial, but find that it is justified by a variety of factors. For example, some argue that, empirically speaking, “[m]uch of the
increase in CEO pay is directly attributable to the increase in
stock prices over the past two decades, as the portion of CEO
pay in stock options has risen dramatically in the past several
years.”129 Moreover, this group justifies the substantial pay differentials between executives and rank and file employees by
arguing that the figures should not be taken at face value.
Perhaps the U.S.’ pay differential is not as bad as it appears
at first glance.130 For example, “certain valuable and traditional
components of an American compensation package take the
form of benefits that are governmentally provided in other
countries.”131 In addition, since tax rates in many other countries are higher than in the U.S., executives in other countries
may receive a “significant amount of nontaxable compensation,
far in excess of the types of fringe benefits most American executives are accustomed to receiving.”132 Lastly, they argue that
CEOs in the U.S. actually have a more substantial job description, and thus have a “high level of responsibility and direct
127. Raphael, supra note 126, at A9.
128. Id. See also Shmukler, supra note 126, at M6. But see Nick Isles, Life
at the Top: The Labour Market for FTSE-250 Chief Executives, The Work
Foundation, available at http://www.theworkfoundation.com/pdf/Life_atthe_
Top.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 1004) (arguing that “the FTSE-250 market is very
home-grown…[and] [c]ompanies are behaving rationally by grooming talented
members of staff to take over the top job when it becomes available.”).
129. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 4–5.
130. Id. at 5 (“Had the stock market declined over this period [of the past
two decades], the change in the differential between CEO and average worker
compensation would look quite different, as the average worker is not paid in
stock options.”). Others argue that U.S. culture is simply more accepting of
greater pay differentials than other countries. See Norma Cohen, Britain
Points Up Cultural Divide, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 9 (quoting Stuart Bell,
research director at PIRC: “The main difference is that U.S. society is more
encouraging of, and tolerant of, a high-earning culture.”).
131. My Executive Makes More than Your Executive, supra note 107, at 66.
132. Id. at 65. For example, “[g]enerous housing allowances are not uncommon and it is not unheard of for bonuses to be paid outside of the executive’s country to avoid the imposition of income tax.” Id. at 65–66. In Germany, a company may pay its executives a “second salary in a tax haven,
which is not reported.” Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 66–67.
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involvement in managing the corporation.”133 Indeed, although
CEO compensation in the U.S. has risen faster than that of the
average employee, it “has risen much slower than the pay of
professional athletes.”134
Still, when comparing the U.S. and the U.K., the empirical
data is undeniable: CEOs in the U.S. earn 45% higher cash
compensation and 190% higher total compensation.135 One
study found that salary levels for U.S. CEOs can be up to ten
times higher than their U.K. counterparts.136 For example, Disney’s CEO, Michael Eisner, nicknamed the “Prince of Pay,”137
exercised options in 1997 that were worth more than the aggregate salaries of the top 500 CEOs in the U.K.138 More recently,
when Eisner failed to meet the requirements that would entitle
him to a bonus two years in a row, “his board lowered the performance bar” so he could receive a bonus.139 In fact, Britain’s
highest-paid executive in 1999,140 Sam Chisolm (of British Sky
Broadcasting), “would only [have] rank[ed] as the 97th highest
among U.S. chief executives.”141 Mark Swartz, former Chief Fi133. My Executive Makes More than Your Executive, supra note 107, at 66–
67.
134. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 5 (“During the period 1980-95, the pay
of the average worker increased 60%, that of CEOs 380%, National Basketball
Association players 640%, National Football League players 800%, and Major
League Baseball players 1000%.”).
135. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper?
CEO Pay in the U.S. and U.K., 110 ECON. J. F640, F641 (2000). But see Graef
Crystal, U.K. CEO Pay has Nothing to Do with Performance, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2002 (stating that “[c]hief executive officers’ pay in the U.K.
defies reason even more than it does in the U.S.”) (on file with author).
136. Isles, supra note 128.
137. Bloomberg columnist and long time pay-critic Graef Crystal gave Eisner this title in 1991. See Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640.
138. Id.
139. Useem, supra note 9, at 59.
140. In 2002, Bart Becht, Chief Executive of Reckitt Benckiser, an AngloDutch household products conglomerate, was the highest paid executive in the
U.K., earning £9million — approximately $14 million (which includes £5.7
million — about $10.4 million — in stock options). Richard Wray, Low Profile
of Highest Paid Boss, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2002.
141. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640–41. Since U.S. companies
are larger, more successful, or in faster growing industries, the empirical
study accounted and controlled for firm size, industry, growth opportunities,
and CEO’s individual skills and abilities. Id. The current CEO of BSkyB,
Tony Ball, earned £7.8 million in 2001 even though the company performed
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nancial Officer of Tyco, won the prize for top-paid executive at
an S&P 500 company in 2002 — “pull[ing] in a whopping $136
million.”142 Swartz’s cohort, Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of
Tyco, was the second-highest-paid executive with $82 million.143
In fact, a study by Equilar, an independent provider of compensation data, found that the median compensation of CEOs of the
100 largest companies in the U.S. rose 14% in 2002, while the
Standard & Poor’s 500 plunged 22.1% that same year.144 Undoubtedly, the recent scandal over the $140 million lump-sum
cash payments given to Richard Grasso, chairman of the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which were in addition to his
base salary of $1.4 million and bonus of at least $1 million,
sparked the most controversy of all U.S. compensation payouts
in 2003.145 Part of the outcry related to the fact that the NYSE
is not a publicly traded entity and, as the world’s largest stock
exchange, serves as a “quasi-public institution with an important regulatory function.”146 Accordingly, these payments were
“more in line with what chief executives of public corporations
are paid and are far above the pay of top officials at the Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and even Nasdaq, a
primary competitor to the Big Board.”147 Under a cacophony of
calls for resignation from the NYSE, institutional investors, and
even politicians, Grasso resigned from the NYSE in September
2003.148

extremely poorly that year. See Finch & Treanor, Executive Pay Leaps Ahead
17%, supra note 114.
142. Useem, supra note 9, at 57.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 58. The study also found that average CEO compensation
dropped by 23% in 2002, but Fortune magazine attributed this decline to the
significant pay decrease of a few “mega-earners.” Id.
145. Landon Thomas, Jr., Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at C1; Landon Thomas, Jr., A Pay Package That
Fat Cats Call Excessive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at C1; Susanne Craig &
Kate Kelly, Large Investors Call for Grasso to Leave NYSE, WALL ST. J., Sept.
17, 2003, at C1.
146. Thomas, supra note 122, at C6.
147. Id.
148. Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Grasso, Who Wanted to be a Cop, In the
End Showed that he Knew When It Was Time to Surrender, WALL ST. J., Sept.
18, 2003, at C1.
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This is not to suggest, however, that executive remuneration
in the U.K. is not excessive.149 In fact, one study reported that
“[f]rom 1993 to 2002, the median salary of the highest paid director in FTSE 100 companies rose 92% from £301,000 to
£579,000.”150 In addition, “[t]he maximum level of annual bonuses [] significantly increased” — in 1999, annual bonuses
were the equivalent of 40-60% of an executive’s salary, while in
2000, they were the equivalent of 100% or more.151 The study
also found “[a] similarly inflationary trend…for share-based
incentive schemes.”152 “A recent poll in Britain found that 80%
of people believe that top directors are overpaid.”153 Comparatively, “British executives earn more than their European counterparts on average, but less than Americans.”154 Indeed, “the
U.K. is second only to the U.S. in terms of the global league for
CEO pay.”155 Unfortunately, these pay standards are on the
rise.156

149. See British Solutions to ‘Fat Cat’ Pay, PAY FOR PERFORMANCE REPORT,
Oct. 1, 2001, available at www.ioma.com/mr/uploads/pfp2_smp.pdf (“Although
executive compensation in the U.K. takes different forms from that in the
U.S., ‘the politically charged issue of boardroom pay continues to hit the headlines’….”) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Kreinberg, supra note 116, at 139 (suggesting that the collapse of Barings PLC, a 233-year-old British banking institution, may have been caused by Barings’ excessive incentive compensation
plan, which “led to the payment of 50% of gross earnings in the form of bonuses”).
150. Press Release, PIRC, PIRC Highlights Huge Increase In Potential And
Real Directors’ Remuneration In Trade & Industry Committee Evidence (July
1, 2003), available at http://www.pirc.co.uk/trade%20&%20industry%20ctte.
pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109, at 13.
154. Raphael, supra note 104, at A9.
155. Isles, supra note 128.
156. Raphael, supra note 104, at A9. Raphael attributes the rise of salaries
of British executives to the globalization of British companies and the fact
that the market for executives has become more global. She states that 10%
of CEOs on the FTSE 100 are non-British, compared to 2% a decade ago. She
also states that greater transparency “has made CEOs more aware of what
their peers are earning.” Id. See also Crystal, supra note 136 (stating that
“CEO pay in the U.K., which seriously lagged behind the pay of American
CEOs for years, is on its way to catching up” and finding that the gap between
pay in the two countries has narrowed from U.S. CEOs earning 3.2 times that
of U.K. counterparts in 1993, to only 1.1 times in 2002).
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Regardless, these extravagant executive salaries have not
gone unnoticed by shareholders in the U.K. For example,
shareholders of Vodafone were quite vocal when Vodafone “proposed making a £10 million157 ‘one-off’ bonus payment to the
chief executive [Christopher Gent] who had orchestrated acquisitions that resulted in the company becoming the world’s largest mobile telephone concern.”158 Despite heavy criticism following these events in 2000, Gent only recently volunteered to step
down as chief executive.159 Termination contracts, to reward
executives leaving a corporation, are also a problem in the U.K.
These “golden goodbyes”160 have caught the eye, and voice, of
shareholders. For example, when Ken Berry, music industry
veteran, was paid £6.1 million (approximately $11.2 million
U.S. dollars) last year upon leaving the corporation, shareholders were outraged and, subsequently, there was “a redesign of
the company’s pay structure.”161 The DTI’s third consultative
document, published in June 2003, focused specifically on severance packages of executives and made recommendations to

157. This is the equivalent of approximately $18.6 million U.S. dollars (as of
February 9, 2004).
158. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 281. Oliver Burkeman, You’d be
Smiling Too, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk
/mobile/article/0,2763,1107234,00.html (describing how Gent was rewarded
with a £10 million “transaction bonus,” in addition to his £1.2 million salary
after negotiating the takeover of Mannesmann, a German telecom giant,
which shareholders felt was “obscenely overvalued.”). In 2000, Gent was paid
nearly £6 million, despite the fact that shareholders lost nearly 20%. John
Duckers, Time to Stop These Fat-Cats Running Away With Cream,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at 26. After criticism from institutional
investors and several publications, Gent “was persuaded to take half the sum
in shares.” See Burkeman, You’d be Smiling Too, supra note 158.
159. Burkeman, You’d be Smiling Too, supra note 158. Notably, however,
on June 19, 2002, Vodafone issued a press release stating that it had engaged
in extensive consultation over its new remuneration policy with shareholder
groups.
160. See Jill Treanor, Multimillion Deals Give a Golden Goodbye to Ousted
Executives, GUARDIAN, Oct. 4, 2002 (Seven directors in the U.K. were given
more than £1million to leave their executive positions in 2001).
161. See id. Mr. Berry had made his reputation by signing the Spice Girls,
but then lost it after signing Mariah Carey to a contract for an album that
flopped. As a result of Berry’s poor judgment, EMI paid almost £38 million to
terminate the contract with Mariah Carey. Id. See also Finch & Treanor,
Executive Pay Leaps Ahead 17%, supra note 114.
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the U.K. government.162 Regardless of whether the company is
located in the U.S. or the U.K., there is guaranteed to be lively
debate and outright criticism regarding the sometimes outrageous compensation paid to executives.
IV. SETTING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND DISCLOSURE
RULES
Aside from the issue of whether CEOs are being paid too
much, there is also the issue of why CEOs are being so well
compensated.163 This question is intertwined with yet another
question: Who sets remuneration figures and policies, and how
much do they have to disclose about such issues?
In fact, in public companies in the U.S. and the U.K. “executive pay is set in much the same way.”164 In both countries, the
board is empowered not only to appoint executives, but also to
set their compensation. However, “the prevailing orthodoxy is
that directors of a publicly quoted company should delegate decisions concerning executive pay to a remuneration or ‘compensation’ committee made up of outside directors.”165 Ironically
enough, both countries are concerned that the “outside directors” are not truly “outside” and are thus influenced in their
decision-making by the directors who appointed them.
A. By what methods or financial instruments are executives
paid?
Beside the difference in the amount of executive payment between the U.S. and the U.K., there is also a difference in the
manner of payment. Executive compensation can take the form
of annual salary, bonuses, share/stock options, and long-term
incentive plans (LTIPs).166 In fact, both U.S. and U.K. execu162. See generally DTI, Consultative Document, Directors’ Remuneration
(Dec. 2001).
163. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 4 (“Overlaying all of these arguments [that CEOs are paid excessively] is the structural argument — corporate boards are ‘captured’ by the CEO and thus incapable of bargaining with
the CEO.”).
164. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 298.
165. Id.
166. In the U.K., LTIPs are usually grants of shares of stock that become
vested (ownership is transferred) upon attainment of specified performance
objectives by the executive. In the U.S., LTIPs take the form of either (1) “‘re-
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tives are paid through a combination of these financial instruments.167 However, the percentage of each that comprises the
executive’s overall salary differs from one to the other.
In the U.S., an executive’s annual base salary comprises approximately 18% of his total compensation; whereas, in the
U.K., an executive’s annual base salary is closer to 40%.168 On
average, stock options comprise 61% of executive compensation
in the U.S.,169 whereas they compromise only 45% payment of
executive compensation in the U.K.170 Thus, U.S. corporate executives rely less on salary and more on stock options; whereas,
,
U.K. executives rely more on fixed salary.171 However restricted
stock, is becoming more popular as a form of executive pay in
the U.S.172
Both U.S. and U.K. executives are paid annual bonuses, as
well. In a 2000 study, it was found that 17% of U.S. executives
compensation was in the form of an annual bonus; whereas, in
the U.K., approximately 18% of executives compensation is
through an annual bonus.173 Although these percentages are
close, in the U.K. an increasing amount of executive compensation is being paid as bonuses.174 Generally speaking, however,
U.S. executives are awarded annual bonuses that are approximately three times more than their U.K. counterparts.175
It is important to note that the manner of payment can affect
the link between executive pay and share performance.176 It
stricted stock’ grants that vest with the passage of time” (and are unrelated to
pre-stated performance objectives), or (2) multi-year bonus plans, which are
usually based on “rolling-average three or five-year cumulative accounting
performance.” Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F644.
167. Id.
168. Wade Lambert, Shared Pain: Teaching a Lesson in Entrepreneurship
Costs One CEO Dearly – Forgoing Salary for Stock Doesn’t Pay for International Power’s Peter Giller, WALL ST. J. (Europe), June 12, 2002, at A1.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hill & Daniel, supra note 9, at 9.
173. Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F640–41.
174. Isles, supra note 128 (citing statistics that five years ago, the upper
limit for annual bonuses was 40% to 60% of an executive’s base salary, but by
2003 that upper limit rose to 100% of base salary).
175. See Conyon & Murphy, supra note 135, at F648.
176. Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through
a Partnership Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153,
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would seem that CEOs with a greater percentage of their total
pay in the form of stock options would have a greater incentive
to increase the price of those shares. However, the grant of
large stock options can have one of two results: it will either
make the CEO work harder to increase the value of the company and its shares, or it will give the CEO incentive to manipulate the stock price (because of his or her own stake in the
price of the shares).177
B. The Law Regarding Setting Executive Compensation in the
U.S.
In a U.S. corporation, the articles of incorporation empower
the board of directors to appoint executives.178 In addition, the
board of directors is generally responsible for setting executive
compensation.179 In most publicly-listed U.S. corporations, however, the board of directors delegates the job of determining
compensation to a compensation committee.180 The corporation’s
human resources department submits pay proposals for compensation committee considerations, with the help of an independent, outside compensation consultant.181 The compensation
committee will then make a recommendation to the board of
executives, which routinely approves such recommendations
202–20 (2000) [hereinafter Vieweing Corporate Executive Compensation
Through a Partnership Lens].
177. The details of such arguments are beyond the scope of this Note, but it
should be noted that both consequences exist. Id.
178. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, supra note 24, §1.01, at 1–2; VARALLO &
DREISBACH, supra note 23, at 14–15.
179. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 176, at 187.
180. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1999).
181. Id. at 1026–27. “Most of these experts come from a handful of wellknown consulting firms specializing in executive compensation matters, many
of which provide a wide variety of other consulting services to the company.”
Id. This practice of hiring a high-paid compensation consultant has been
criticized by Warren Buffet, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and an
outspoken proponent of strong corporate governance. Buffett has stated that
“when the compensation committee — armed as always with support from a
high-paid consultant — reports on a mega-grant of options to the CEO, it
would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to suggest that the
committee reconsider.” Fat Cats Feeding, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting Warren Buffett).
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It is important to note that
“without much inquiry.”182
“[s]hareholders have no direct input in this process…They can
voice their opinions to the board of directors in a variety of ways
before and after the package is approved, but this only indirectly affects the outcome of the process.”183
Disclosure is one aspect of U.S. corporate governance law that
has a profound effect on compensation policies since “there is
reason to believe that disclosure might have a restraining effect
on the level of compensation.”184 Some argue, however, that disclosure “encourages better compensation plans (in terms of
aligning managers’ interests with shareholders’).”185 Unsurprisingly, the SEC, with regard to disclosure of executive compensation and compensation policies, favors heightened disclosure
by companies.186
In the early 1990s, the SEC tightened its disclosure regulations regarding executive compensation. Although it does not
limit or cap executive compensation, the SEC enacted rules affecting corporate disclosure of executive compensation for proxy
and information statements.187 For example, corporations are
required to produce and disclose a “Summary Compensation
Table,” which shows annual and long-term compensation in a
single comprehensive form.188 In addition, the board’s Compensation Committee must report the corporate performance factors it relied on in making specific compensation awards, and
must also report the corporation’s general compensation policies.189 Finally, the corporation must prepare a “Performance
Graph,” comparing shareholder return over the past five years

182. Thomas & Martin, supra note 180, at 1027.
183. Id. (but noting that boards will take shareholders’ views into consideration to insure the passage of any proposed stock option plan).
184. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 23.
185. Id.
186. See generally Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992). See also SEC, Executive Compensation: A Guide for Investors, available at http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/exec omp0803.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2004). Extensive disclosure should lower the cost of monitoring for shareholders. Id.
187. See SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release of 1992, supra
note 186.
188. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.402, 229.402 (1999).
189. See id.
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to shareholders in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, and to a
group of peer companies chosen by the corporation.190
Setting compensation is an area that is mainly left to the
good judgment of the corporation and is thus an area that the
judicial system usually declines to examine.191 Courts generally
leave compensation questions to the business judgment of a
corporation or the SEC.192 For example, in Lewis v. Vogelstein, a
leading case on the issue of shareholder derivative suits for excessive executive pay, the Delaware Chancery Court held that
plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for breach of the duty
of disclosure (regarding executive stock options plans which
were approved by shareholder vote) primarily because the company’s failure to disclose the value of the stock options was
more a result of uncertainty in valuing stock options than intentional manipulation on the part of the board.193 Although the
court did not dismiss the complaint entirely, it did note that the
plaintiffs would face the large burden of overcoming Delaware’s
high waste standard in order to proceed.194 In order to determine that the stock options constituted waste of the corporation’s assets, the plaintiffs would have to show that the stock
options were “in effect a gift” and that no substantial consideration was received by the corporation in exchange for the
grant.195 The court noted that the corporation gets the benefit of
a “good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile.”196 More recently, however, the Delaware
Court of Chancery allowed a shareholder derivative action to go
forward, basing their decision on the Disney Company’s lack of
due care in granting a $140 million severance package and

190. Id.
191. See Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 176, at 181–82.
192. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332–33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“Judgments concerning what disclosure, if any, of estimated present values of options should be mandated are best made at this stage of the science, not by a
court under a very general materiality standard, but by an agency with finance expertise….[such as] the Securities and Exchange Commission.”).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 336.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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other employment perks to Michael Ovitz.197 The court found
that the facts alleged, if true, “belie any assertion” that Disney’s
directors “exercised any business judgment or made any good
faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed to Disney
and its shareholders.”198 In particular, the court pointed to the
plaintiff’s allegations that the board and the compensation
committee both spent less than an hour reviewing Ovitz’s qualifications to serve as president of Disney, that neither the board
nor the compensation committee reviewed the actual employment agreement or salary and severance provisions therein,
and that no expert was hired to evaluate the terms of Ovitz’s
employment package.199 While this decision may signal the beginning of more litigation in this area, such a conclusion is
merely speculative at this point.200
C. The Law Regarding Setting Executive Compensation in the
U.K.
According to the DTI, compensation of U.K. executives should
be linked to performance.201 Article 82 allows directors “such
remuneration as the company may by ordinary resolution determine.”202 Moreover, Article 84 provides that directors may
appoint a managing director or other executive officer and remunerate such person as they see fit.203 Generally speaking, a
public company’s articles of association will empower the board
to set executive remuneration.204 Since the early 1990s, most
publicly traded U.K. companies have established remuneration
committees, pursuant to the disclosure-oriented guidance out-

197. See generally In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d
275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
198. Id. at 287.
199. Id.
200. For a general discussion of the recent success of shareholder litigation
in the area of corporate governance, see John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, 89
A.B.A. J, 38, 38 (2003). See also Gretchen Morgensen, Shareholders Win in
Effort to Alter Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at C1 (discussing corporations
settling lawsuits with shareholders by agreeing to change offensive corporate
governance practices).
201. See generally REWARDS FOR FAILURE, supra note 98.
202. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, art. 82.
203. Id. art. 84.
204. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 286–87.
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lined in the Combined Code.205 The Combined Code suggests
that such committees be composed “exclusively” of nonexecutive directors free from managerial influence.206
The Combined Code gives guidance on other remunerationrelated issues. For example, the Code suggests that the level of
remuneration should only be sufficient to retain directors with
the competence to run the company, but not higher, and should
be structured to link compensation awards to performance.207
The Code also suggests that grants under option and other incentive plans be parceled out over time, rather than awarded in
one large block.208 The Combined Code also addresses the appropriate composition of remuneration. It suggests that annual
bonuses and long term incentive schemes be supplemental to a
director’s salary and that any such deferred remuneration or
options not be exercised for at least three years.209 A one-year
limit on service contracts, especially for newly recruited directors, is also recommended.210 By suggesting that directors remain uninvolved in setting his or her own compensation, the
Code maintains its focus on independent and transparent remuneration-setting procedures.211 In addition, director performance should be factored into bonuses212 and criteria such as the
company’s status and success in relation to other similarlysituated companies should factor into incentive schemes.213 Disclosure is another keystone of the Combined Code. In its annual report, the Code suggests that companies disclose the
membership of the remuneration committee,214 the remuneration policy,215 and details of each individual director’s remuneration package (and reasons for such remuneration).216 The Code
also recommends that shareholders have a vote at the AGM to

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, paras. B.2.1 (June 1998).
Id. at para. B.2.1.
Id. at para. B.1.
Id. at schedule A, para. 4.
Id. at schedule A, paras. 1–2.
Id. at paras. B.1.7–1.8.
Id. at para. B.2.
Id. at schedule A, paras. 1–2.
Id. at schedule A, para. 4.
Id. at para. B.2.3.
Id. at paras. B.3.1–3.2.
Id. at schedule B, paras. 1–3.
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approve the board’s annual remuneration report217 and that
shareholders vote to approve any new long term incentive
schemes.218
Unfortunately, a large portion of listed companies do not
comply with the Code and, indeed, have at least one senior executive on the remuneration committee.219 Indeed, a recent
study by the Pensions Investment Research Consultants suggests that less than 40% of the average remuneration committees in the U.K. is comprised of fully independent directors.220
Interestingly enough, even one member of the renumeration
committee of the London Stock Exchange’s (a publicly listed
company) is not independent.221 However, even if such committees were truly “independent” bias would remain an issue. This
is because “[i]n most listed companies, a nominating committee
will work together with the chairman of the board to select the
individuals who ultimately serve as non-executive directors.”222
These individuals “have been chosen on the basis that they ‘fitin’ with the company, in the sense that they identify with its
goals and are compatible with the management team.”223 Exacerbating this potential bias is the fact that CEOs often attend
such meetings. The PIRC studied compliance with the Combined Code in 1999 (the year it first became effective) and determined that director’s pay was one area where compliance
was poor.224 With regard to one-year contracts for executives,
217. Id. at para. B.3.5 & schedule A, para.3.
218. Id. at paras. B.2.4, B.3.2, B.3.5.
219. See PENSIONS INVESTMENT RESEARCH CONSULTANTS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ANNUAL REVIEW (2002). See also Press Release, PIRC, Boards
Dominated By Executives And Connected Directors (Dec. 12, 2002) (“After
four years of operation, 34% of companies state that they fully comply with
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance.” More than 75% of company
boards in the UK are controlled by executives and no-executives who are not
independent.)
220. See PENSIONS INVESTMENT RESEARCH CONSULTANTS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ANNUAL REVIEW (2002), supra note 219. See also Press Release,
Boards Dominated By Executives And Connected Directors, supra note 219.
221. LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2002).
222. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 285.
223. Id. at 285.
224. See PIRC DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.pirc.co.uk/docind.htm. See
also PIRC Press Release, Compliance with Combined Code Worst on Directors’ Pay Issues (Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.pirc.uk/pr20dec.htm.
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voting on remuneration reports, and fully independent remuneration committees, the PIRC found that only 51% of companies had one year contracts for executive directors, only 27% of
companies disclosed that their board had considered voting on
remuneration committee reports at their annual meeting, and
approximately 77% of companies had a wholly independent remuneration committee.225 In addition, in 1999, the DTI commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PWC”) to monitor compliance
by listed companies with both the Greenbury best practice
framework and the Combined Code.226 PWC found that only 7
out of 270 companies (3%) complied with the Greenbury Report
recommendation that shareholders should have a vote at the
AGM on remuneration policies.227 PWC also found that in 81
out of 298 companies (27%), the board chairman was also the
chair of the remuneration committee; in only 17 of 298 companies (6%) the majority of the members of the remuneration
committee were non-independent, non-executive directors.228
These numbers show poor compliance with the Combined
Code’s recommendation that “[r]emuneration committees
should consist exclusively of non-executive directors who are
independent of management and free from any business or
other relationship which could materially interfere with the
exercise of their independent judgment.”229
Traditionally, U.K. shareholders, specifically institutional
shareholders, have been hesitatnt to bring derivative lawsuits
relating to corporate governance issues because of procedural,
financial, and substantive hurdles.230 In addition, U.K. judges
have been, and continue to be, reluctant to interfere with executive compensation.231 Legislation is one area where shareholdThe survey covers 468 companies from the FTSE All Share Index and covers
the period from Dec. 31, 1998 until June 30, 1999. Id.
225. See PIRC DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT, supra note 224.
226. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July
1999), at annex A (July 1999).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, para. B.2.2 (June
1998).
230. STAPLEDON, supra note 12, at 131–33.
231. See Henderson v. Bank of Australia, LR 40 Ch. D. 170, 181 (1889) (stating that “[i]t is not for the judge to express any opinion upon such matters as
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ers can turn for support since executive remuneration in the
U.K. is somewhat regulated through the Companies Act of
1985. For example, under section 311 of the Companies Act, a
company is prohibited from paying a director remuneration that
is not subject to income tax.232
With sparse procedural safeguards for concerned U.K. shareholders, the issue becomes whether such shareholders have
their own voice in the remuneration debate. As Cheffins and
Thomas observe, “[w]hile the general rule in the U.K. is that
shareholders do not have a direct say over executive pay, the
pattern is subject to exceptions.”233 Some sections of the Companies Act give shareholders a voice in setting remuneration.
For instance, sections 312 through 314 of the Companies Act of
1985 provide that a company’s shareholders have the right to
vote by resolution on employment contracts for executives. Section 312 specifically proscribes that a company first obtain
shareholders’ approval before it may compensate a director for
leaving the corporation.234 A company cannot enter into an employment contract with a director for a term of more than five
years without the shareholders consent by such resolution.235
Finally, section 232, a disclosure provision, requires that the
company disclose, in the notes to the accounts, payments and
other benefits given to directors.236 In the U.K., shareholders
can attempt to challenge executive remuneration as constituting “unfair prejudicial conduct” under section 459 of the Companies Act.237 Although the phrase “unfair prejudicial conduct”
whether the amount [of directors’ remuneration] is too large or too small: the
directors of the company know a great deal [more] about these matters than [a
judge] can possibly do”); In Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons, [1994] B.C.C. 475
(C.A.) (holding that the directors did not violate their fiduciary powers despite
the fact that the petitioner alleged that the directors had kept the struggling
company going for the sole purpose of paying themselves compensation).
232. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 311.
233. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 287.
234. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 312.
235. Id. §§ 312–14.
236. Id. § 232. In 2002, the U.K. government made it mandatory that
shareholders give an advisorial vote at the AGM on remuneration packages
and policies. See infra Part VI.
237. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 459. See also In Re Saul D. Harrison &
Sons, [1994] B.C.C. 475 (C.A.), (petitioner arguing that directors engaged in
“unfair prejudicial conduct,” violating section 459, when they paid themselves
excessive salaries despite the fact that the business was operating at a loss).
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is not defined in the statute, “various meanings have been attributed to it including from ‘oppression,’ ‘discrimination,’ or
‘incompetence.’”238
Another place shareholders can look to for rights is the U.K.
Listing Authority Listing Rules. The Listing Rules give shareholders in a listed company the right to approve executive share
option schemes and LTIPs.239
Although some commentators have debated about the shareholders’ role in setting compensation in the first instance, the
next section of this Note focuses on how shareholders can challenge compensation after it has been set.240
V. CHALLENGING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
There are three basic methods by which a shareholder can
challenge executive compensation: suing, selling, and voting.241
As previously mentioned, suing is not usually a viable option for
shareholders in either the U.S. or the U.K. because courts apply
a “hands off” approach when it comes to compensation issues,
preferring to leave such decisions to the corporation.242 In addition, at least in the U.S., the procedural and economic hurdles
to bringing a derivative suit for excessive compensation are
immense.243 Of course, shareholders can always sell their
shares244 or refuse to invest in companies that they feel overpay

238. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 312–14.
239. Financial Services Authority, Listing Rules, supra note 49, at para.
13.13. For long term incentive plans, see para. 13.13A, defining “long-term
incentive scheme.” A listed company that does not obtain shareholder approval in accordance with these Rules can be censured or delisted. See also
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 287.
240. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 175, at 187–201.
241. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569
(2001).
242. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300 (“In the U.K., this course of
action has only rarely been pursued.”).
243. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 175, at 187–201.
244. “Historically, shareholders unhappy with the management of a company simply ‘vote[d] with their feet’ by selling their shares.” Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens, supra note 175, at
187–88.
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their executives.245 However, selling does not necessarily guarantee a change in remuneration policy. This Note focuses on
challenging executive compensation through shareholder voting.
A. Challenges by Proposal
There are three main avenues by which shareholders may
choose to challenge pay practices by proposal: (1) proposals that
restrict or cap executive pay; (2) proposals that would alter corporate compensation policy so that shareholder approval of pay
is required; and (3) proposals that would restrict repricing of
stock options without first securing shareholder approval.246
In the U.S., SEC Rule 14a-8 (federal proxy rules) gives
shareholders the option of putting forth a proposal to be voted
on at the annual meeting.247 Such proposals are not selfexecuting, but rather serve as mere recommendations to the
board. However, if the proposal consists of an amendment to
the corporation’s bylaws, it can become part of the governance
structure of the corporation. While this may sound like an idyllic solution for a concerned shareholder, “[b]ylaw amendments,
especially those dealing with pay issues, are a relatively rare
phenomenon.”248 In 1998 the SEC recognized this problem249 and
suggested that “shareholders could use Rule 14a-8 to propose
bylaw amendments related to pay practices.”250 To be eligible to
submit a proposal, a shareholder “must have continuously held
at least $2,000 in market value, or 1% of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at

245. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 25–26 (noting that “[i]f one believes that excessive pay is pervasive in corporate America, then exiting one
company would logically mean exiting the market.”).
246. Id. at 26–27.
247. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
248. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 26. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8
(1998).
249. See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (1998). The SEC suggested this same
practice in 1992. SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 48,126.
250. See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (1998). See also Loewenstein, supra
note 103, at 25–26.
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least one year by the date you submit the proposal.”251 Each
shareholder may submit only one proposal per meeting252 and
the burden is “on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled
to exclude the proposal.”253
Another limitation on shareholder proposals is that there is a
deadline by which the proposal must be sent to the corporation.
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8, if the proposal is to be included in the
proxy materials for the annual meeting, it must be “received at
the company’s principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company’s proxy statement
released to shareholders in connection with the previous year’s
annual meeting.”254 For proposals that are submitted for special
meetings (any meeting other than the annual meeting), the materials must be received by the corporation “a reasonable time
before the company begins to print and mail its proxy materials.”255
When a corporation disagrees with a shareholder proposal
and wishes to exclude the proposal, it will usually advise the
SEC and attempt to justify its position.256 If the SEC agrees
with the justification, it will issue a “no-action” letter, advising
the shareholder not to pursue the proposal further.257
Regardless of whether shareholder proposals relating to executive pay take the form of non-binding recommendations or
bylaw amendments, historically such “shareholder proposals in

251. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (1998). The shareholder must hold the securities through the date of the meeting.
252. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1998). The proposal cannot exceed 500 words.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (1998).
253. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g) (1998). However, many corporations regularly
exclude proposals based on the grounds that the proposal is within the ordinary business operations of the company. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7)
(1998).
254. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2) (1998).
255. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(3) (1998).
256. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-8(g) (1998) (“The burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.”). See also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14-8(j)(1)-(2) (1998).
257. While shareholders who receive such letters may not submit their proposals to a shareholder vote, they may still pursue the matter in court. See
generally Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in
SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 921, 923–46 (1998).
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this area generally have not fared well.”258 Indeed, “[i]t is true
that shareholder proposals on executive compensation issues
frequently do not succeed.”259 In 1998, the Investor Responsibility Research Center conducted a study which calculated the
percentage of votes for shareholder proposals regarding remuneration.260 The 1998 survey results demonstrated that, not
only had voting decreased on shareholder proposals to limit
compensation, but that the number of proposals had also decreased.261 Moreover, the study concluded that “[s]hareholder
support for executive compensation proposals is not as high as
with most other types of shareholder proposals.”262 Encouragingly, in 2002 there were “275 shareholder proposals to rein in
executive pay” — a record number.263 Only two of the proposals,
however, received majority votes, and regardless, “management
is free to ignore those mostly nonbinding resolutions and routinely does.”264
Similar to Rule 14a-8, section 376 of the Companies Act of
1985 allows shareholders to submit proposals to be voted on at
the AGM. Unlike Rule 14a-8, however, shareholders submitting proposals in the U.K. have more freedom regarding the
substance of the proposal, mainly because the Companies Act
takes a hands-off approach to the matter.265
There are some obstacles for shareholders wishing to utilize
section 376. First, unlike Rule 14a-8 of the U.S. federal proxy
rules, which allows proposals at both annual and special meetings of shareholders, section 376 limits shareholder proposals to
annual meetings.266 Despite a more flexible approach to the sub258. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 26.
259. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 175, at 195.
260. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, SUMMARY OF 1998 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS 2 (Feb. 3, 1999).
261. See id.
262. Id. It is possible that as a result of the Enron debacle and consequent
corporate governance reforms (and increased shareholder activism), shareholder proposals in this area could become more widespread.
263. Useem, supra note 9, at 64.
264. Id. (Hewlett-Packard and Tyco were the only two companies where
shareholder proposals regarding executive pay received a majority of votes).
265. There is no exception in the Companies Act for “ordinary business operations” as in Rule 14a-8. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 376–81.
266. Id. § 376.
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stance of shareholder proposals, the U.K. takes a fairly rigid
approach to the procedural hurdles that a shareholder must
surpass to succeed in getting a proposal approved.267 As mentioned earlier, the cost of circulating a proposal will usually be
borne by the proposal’s proponent.268 The corporation has the
right to request that the shareholder pay for the costs of the
circulation of the resolution and any accompanying statement.269
Statutory ownership thresholds are another barrier for
shareholders in the U.K. In order to make a proposal, an individual shareholder or group of shareholders must own at least
5% of the voting rights of the company.270 Due to the fact that
few individual shareholders can satisfy this ownership requirement, it is necessary for institutional shareholders, who
will meet the statutory threshold percentage, to take the lead.271
Another problem is that such proposals are advisorial only —
even if a shareholder resolution is passed, management is allowed to disregard the resolution.272
B. Challenges to Share Option Plans
In the U.S., some shareholders may have a vote regarding
stock options paid to executives. For example, some state laws
require that shareholders approve stock option plans before
they can be effectuated.273 However, many states follow the
Model Business Corporations Act, which does support such
shareholder voting.274 In fact, Delaware (where many U.S. companies choose to incorporate) follows the Model Business Corpo267. Id. § 377.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 377(1)(b).
270. Id. § 376(2).
271. See, e.g., Tony Tassell, Investors Push For Cap on Executive Pay-offs:
Pension Funds Move to Stem Rising Compensation Tide, NAT. POST, Apr. 18,
2002, at FP16 (“Leading investor groups are holding talks about stemming the
rising tide of pay-offs for sacked executives.”).
272. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986,
§ 7.
273. In New York, shareholders used to get a vote on such plans under New
York Business and Corporations Law, § 505(d). However, this section was
changed, and shareholders of New York corporations no longer have this
right. Under New York, if the stock exchange rules require voting, then New
York will also. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 505(d) (McKinney 2003).
274. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 624(a) (2003).
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rations approach in not allowing shareholder votes regarding
stock options.275 This is unfortunate since, as noted above, share
options constitute a substantial percentage of an executive’s pay
in the U.S.276 and therefore a vote on stock options could increase
shareholder involvement in setting executive pay. In addition,
corporations can benefit from tax deductions if they put executive compensation plans to a shareholder vote.277
The NYSE, the NASDAQ Stock Market, and the American
Stock Exchange all have listing rules that require shareholder
votes on option plans, with certain exceptions.278 However, “the
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ are contemplating
changing their listing rules to address a loophole which allows
companies to bypass the shareholder approval process where
plans include a substantial number of employee participants as
well as corporate executives.”279 In addition, as discussed in
Part VI (Recent Developments) infra, the NYSE has just proposed a new rule which would require that shareholders approve equity-compensation plans within twelve months for
adoption by the board of directors, as per the Internal Revenue
Code.280
In both the U.S. and the U.K. executive compensation may
potentially be challenged based on breach of fiduciary duties.281
275. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2003).
276. Lambert, supra note 168, at A1.
277. A provision of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) provides that a corporation that pays an executive more than $1 million annually, may receive a
tax deduction, but only if the amount was paid pursuant to a “performancebased plan.” See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (1998). According the IRC, a plan is
only considered “performance-based” if it is ratified by shareholders.
278. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Corporate Governance Rules, §
303A, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, Options to
Officers, Directors, or Key Employees, part 7, §§ 710-713, available at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanstockeangeAMEX/AmexCompanyGuide/PA
RT7/SHAREHOLDERSAPPROVALSS710-713/072F000379.asp (last visited
Feb. 12, 2004); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, IM-4350-5, Shareholder Approval for Stock Option Plans or Other Equity Compensation Arrangements,
available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?Se leNode=4&File
Name=/nasd/nasd_rules/RulesoftheAssociation_mg.xml#chp_1_4.
279. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300.
280. See infra Part VI.
281. There is some evidence to conclude that shareholder derivative suits
challenging breach of fiduciary duties are more successful in the U.S. and
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In derivative litigation in the U.S., the board will typically have
the burden of proving the fairness of the compensation award if
it is a self-interested transaction,282 and might therefore have
incentive, from a litigation perspective, to allow a shareholder
vote on share option plans.
C. Challenges at the Annual Meeting
It has been suggested that shareholders should have a right
to a non-binding, advisory vote at the annual meeting on executive compensation matters. 283 Some argue that there is support
for the fact that management will pay attention to shareholder
votes on remuneration issues at the annual meeting,284 the
U.K., recently amended the Companies Act to grant shareholders this right.285
Aside from voting directly on compensation, shareholders can
exercise other voting rights. For example, shareholders of publicly listed companies in both the U.S. and the U.K. are given
the right to elect directors.286 Thus, such shareholders may vote
not to re-elect directors on the remuneration committees whom
they feel either pay excessive compensation or promulgate compensation policies that are too flexible.287 In the U.K., the National Association of Pension Funds (“NAPF”) did just this.288 In
2001, the NAPF (whose members own almost 25% of the UK
stock market), reacting to excessive pay given to the Royal
Bank of Scotland’s executives, “urged shareholders to register a
protest in this fashion.”289 In the U.S., the SEC has recently
proposed that shareholders have greater power to nominate and
therefore serve as a better check on excessive executive remuneration. See
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 300–01.
282. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
283. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 28; see also Thomas & Martin, The
Effect of Shareholder Proposals supra note 180, at 1046–48.
284. Id.
285. See infra Part VI.
286. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, supra note 24, §1.01, at 1–2 (1993) (“Most
central to shareholders’ role then is their power to elect directors, and statutes
typically refer to that shareholder power expressly.”); CHARKHAM, supra note
22, at 182; Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 303.
287. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 176, at 191.
288. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 3, at 289.
289. Id.
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appoint directors.290 At the annual meeting, U.K. shareholders
are given a vote on the company’s accounts.291 Shareholders that
choose to vote against the accounts are making a statement —
that they object to the corporation’s pay policies.292
Unfortunately, neither voting against the re-election of directors nor voting against the company accounts are all that meaningful. For one, questionable directors may not be up for vote at
the time the shareholder votes. Also, many shareholders will
choose not to vote against a remuneration committee director if
that shareholder feels that the director provides useful skills for
other aspects of running the corporation.293 Moreover, there is a
strong argument that many shareholders do not even vote —
that “shareholders are apathetic and often fail to open their
proxy materials, much less take the time to complete a proxy
card and mail it back to the company.”294 Indeed, the most recent figures from a study conducted by Pensions Investment
Research Consultants suggest that voting turnout, while showing an improvement during 2001-2002,295 did not improve during 2002-2003.296
VI. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
There have been recent developments in both the U.S. and
the U.K. regarding shareholder voting on executive pay. At the
290. S.E.C. Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R.
Parts 239, 249, and 274, Release Nos. 33-8131, 34-46518, IC-25739.
291. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986,
§ 7.
292. This is because directors must prepare a remuneration report as part
of the company’s accounts. Id. § 3.
293. Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens, supra note 176, at 200.
294. See Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 27.
295. See Press Release, PIRC, Growing Voting Opposition at UK Listed
Companies (Oct. 9, 2002) (finding that average voting levels for FTSE 350
companies rose from 51% to 55% and for FTSE All Share companies there was
a rise from 50% to 53%). The study also found that “[d]irectors’ pay remains
important but is not the main issue which has attracted dissenting votes during the year.” Id. Remuneration issues such as excessive share schemes and
remuneration policies attracted an increasing number of dissenting votes. Id.
296. See Press Release, PIRC, Upward Voting Trend Halted Says PIRC:
PIRC’s Annual Survey Highlights “Shareholders Continued Failure To Vote
At U.K. Listed Companies” (Aug. 29, 2003).
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end of 2002, the U.K. Parliament implemented a new voting
policy for shareholders at the AGM and the NYSE just amended
its listing rules to give shareholders a right to vote on equity
compensation plans297 — both of which should have positive effects for shareholder voting rights. In addition, the SEC has
weighed in with proposals related to important issues in this
area.298 The U.K. Parliament passed an amendment to the U.K.
Companies Act, which went into effect on August 1, 2002.299 The
new amendment requires that shareholders vote at the AGM on
the directors’ remuneration report.300 Schedule 7A301 of the new
regulations provides that the directors’ remuneration report
must contain several disclosures to the voting shareholders.302
Pursuant to Part 2 of Schedule 7A, the report must contain
information regarding four areas of compensation. First, the
report must disclose “the circumstances surrounding the consideration by the directors of matters pertaining to directors’
remuneration.”303 Second, the report must contain “a statement
of the company’s policy on directors’ remuneration for the following financial year.”304 Third, the report must contain a performance graph “which sets out the total shareholder return of
the company on the class of equity share capital, if any, which
caused the company to fall within the definition of ‘quoted company.’”305 Lastly, the report must include certain information
regarding each director’s service contract.306 Part 3 of Schedule
7A sets out other areas of compensation which must be disclosed in the remuneration report, including share options, long

297. See Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI 2002/1986,
§ 7; See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A.
298. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A; Viewing
Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership Lens, supra note
176, at 188–91.
299. See generally Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI
2002/1986.
300. See id. § 7. The new shareholder voting requirement has been inserted
as § 241A of the Companies Act.
301. Schedule 7A is now inserted after the already existing Schedule 7 of
the Companies Act. Id. § 9.
302. Id. at sched. 7A.
303. See id. at “Explanatory Note.”
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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term incentive plans, pensions, and compensation and excess
retirement benefits of each director.307
Although much of this disclosure is already required by the
SEC in the U.S.,308 the mandatory shareholder vote at the AGM
is not required in the U.S.309 Despite the fact that the new U.K.
shareholder vote is only advisory, it seems as though, at the
very least, shareholders now have an opportunity to voice their
opinion. In fact, the new legislation basically codifies the suggestions from the voluntary codes.310 Indeed, the new voting
amendment, albeit merely advisory, is preferable to the former
voluntary scheme. Under the voluntary scheme, whereby companies had the option of putting the remuneration packages up
for shareholder vote, few companies allowed such votes.311
However, the U.S. is not standing idly by with regard to excessive executive compensation. On June 30, 2003, the SEC
approved a proposal by the NYSE which requires that shareholders approve executive equity-compensation plans.312 The
text of the new rule, codified in Section 303A(8) of the Exchange’s Listed Company Manual, reads as follows: “Shareholders must be given the opportunity to vote on all equitycompensation plans and material revisions thereto, with limited
exceptions.”313 The Exchange commented that such equitycompensation plans (which would include plans under which
directors pay less than fair market value for shares and which
are not available to shareholders generally), “can help align
shareholder and management interests.”314 In addition, the Ex-

307. Id.
308. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.402, 229.402 (1999).
309. See SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Release of 1992, supra
note 186.
310. See discussion supra Part II.C.
311. In 2001, only 30 of the FTSE 350 companies allowed shareholders a
vote on executive compensation. See Jill Treanor & Richard Wray, Top Pay
Vote ‘Not Enough,’ GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/executivepay/story/0,1204,577504,00.html.
312. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A.
313. Id. § 303A.08 (Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plans).
The new rule is also referenced in § 312.03(a) of the Exchange’s Listing Rules
(Shareholder Approval). “Equity-compensation plan” is defined broadly to
include a “compensatory grant of options or other equity securities that is not
made under a plan.” Id.
314. Id.
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change noted that part of the purpose of this stockholder approval was “to provide checks and balances on the potential dilution resulting from the process of earmarking shares to be
used for equity-based awards.”315 The commentary also mentions that there are exceptions to the voting requirement —
some plans are exempt from the requirement of shareholder
approval.316 For example, employment inducement awards are
not subject to such a vote in the context of mergers and acquisitions.317 The NYSE’s most recent corporate governance standards, as set forth in the Exchange’s Listing Company Manual,
Section 303A, and approved by the SEC on November 4, 2003,
also require that listed companies have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.318 In addition,
the compensation committee “must have a written charter that
addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities…to review and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to
CEO compensation, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of
those goals and objectives and…determine and approve the
CEO’s compensation level based on this evaluation.”319 The
compensation committee must also have a written charter that
addresses “an annual performance evaluation of the compensation committee.”320
VII. LOOKING AHEAD — A FOCUS ON SHAREHOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Unfortunately, “[e]nthusiasts for corporate governance do not
spend much time discussing the shareholders’ responsibilities,
preferring to concentrate on shareholders’ rights instead.”321
Perhaps a paradigm shift is necessary to avoid the almost ironic
inevitability of investors who are passive regarding corporate
governance, but then become irate when executives pillage the
very companies the investors own, in which they have little in315. Id. It is important to note here that “material revisions” to such plans
(i.e., a material increase in the number of shares available under the plan) are
also subject to shareholder vote under this new rule. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 278, § 303A.05(a).
319. Id. § 303A.05(b)(i)(A).
320. Id. § 303A.05(b)(ii).
321. Who’s in Charge?, supra note 26, at 21.

File: Jackie2.20.04.doc

790

Created on: 2/20/2004 7:31 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:35 PM

[Vol. 29:2

volvement. One author has noted that “[s]omewhere along the
line, managers – who are, after all, just hired hands — started
behaving as if they owned the place. And the real owners —
mostly mutual funds and pensions — starting behaving as if
they didn’t.”322 This same author, somewhat cryptically began
an article critiquing CEO pay with a quotation from George
Orwell’s novel “Animal Farm”: “But the pigs were so clever that
they could think of a way round every difficulty.”323 Is this then,
the destiny of the regulations regarding executive greed — to be
one-step behind clever corporations and over-paid executives at
all times?324 As per the “Law of Unintended Compensation,”
“any attempt to reduce compensation has the perverse result of
increasing it.”325 Indeed, one need look no further than the
scandal involving Richard Grasso to see that regulations cannot
be the sole impetus to curtail excessive executive pay.326 While
the NYSE was in the process of proposing new amendments to
its Listing Manual, which have since become the amended voting rules on equity compensation plans, the NYSE was paying
Grasso amounts which made some Wall Street CEOs blush.327
Perhaps, the answer is not through regulation, as discussed
previously, but activism from below. In 2002, the CEO of Cendant Corp., a corporation which has been “revamping its corporate governance since its 1998 accounting scandal” to include
such provisions as shareholder approval of executive stock options, stated: “I think the real impetus [for reform] will not be
the NYSE, the President, or Congress — it will be the reality of

322. Useem, supra note 9, at 57, 64.
323. Id. at 57.
324. Useem also notes in his article: “Regulation is a spur to innovation,
and in the pay arena innovation always means “more.” Id. at 59.
325. Id. at 59. (Citing examples from 1989, 1992, and 1993, wherein Congress attempted to place hurdles in the way of rising executive compensation
only to have the perverse effect of compensation skyrocketing as a result).
326. See Thomas, Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, supra
note 145, at C1; Thomas, A Pay Package That Fat Cats Call Excessive, supra
note 145, at C1; Craig & Kelly, supra note 145, at C1; Kelly & Craig, supra
note 148, at C1.
327. See Thomas, Big Board Chief Will Get a $140 Million Package, supra
note 145, at C1; Thomas, A Pay Package That Fat Cats Call Excessive, supra
note 145, at C1; Craig & Kelly, supra note 145, at C1; Kelly & Craig, supra
note 148, at C1.
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the marketplace.”328 Shifting the focus from government regulation to shareholders, “the ostensible owners of companies,” to
play a larger role in setting executive pay would “play to capitalism’s strength — its flexibility.”329 The SEC has taken just
this stance by passing a new disclosure-oriented rule, which
will take effect in the summer of 2004, requiring mutual funds
to disclose the way they vote their shares.330 Until recently, only
a handful of mutual funds have disclosed how they voted proxies.331 In the U.K., mutual funds are not obligated to reveal how
they vote.332 Part of the problem with mutual funds and other
institutional investors may stem from conflicts of interest —
“banks, insurance companies and mutual funds all want a company’s banking, insurance or pensions business, so they will
hesitate to cast the proxy votes of their investment arms
against the management.”333 Indeed, “some company directors
are known to meet the institutional shareholders privately to
make presentations or discuss with them the future of the company.”334 When this scenario occurs, institutional investors are
not flexing their “financial muscles” on behalf of those they
have a fiduciary duty to represent.335 CalPERS, one of America’s largest investment funds, is a role model for other institutional investors.336 CalPERS has been active in “publicly con328. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 112.
329. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109.
330. See SEC Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R.
Parts 239, 249, and 274 (One of the goals of this proposed rule is “increased
transparency” to “enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies, which could have a
dramatic impact on shareholder value.”). See also Useem, supra note 9, at 64.
331. See John Wasik, Speak Loudly — Or Lose Your Big Stick, FIN. TIMES,
July 24, 2002, at 26 (only eight retail mutual fund groups openly disclose how
they vote on proxies).
332. Polly Toynbee, Starve the Fat Cats, GUARDIAN, May 16, 2003, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,957194,00.html (urging
that a change in the law which does not require disclosure of mutual fund
voting in the U.K. is necessary).
333. Id.
334. Mohammed B. Hemraj, How Shareholders’ Activism Can Refrain Directors from Highjacking the Company, COMPANY L. 24(11), 345–46 (2003).
335. Id.
336. Craig & Kelly, Large Investors Call for Grasso to Leave NYSE, supra
note 145, at C1, C3.
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fronting companies whose governance it questions,” such as
Walt Disney Co., eBay Inc., Time Warner, and most recently,
the NYSE.337
In addition, private shareholders are often uninterested in
exercising their ownership privileges, such as voting, because
they merely “want a financial product.”338 But what worth does
a right have when it remains unexercised? For example, the
U.K. Parliament passed an amendment to the U.K. Companies
Act, which went into effect on August 1, 2002, requiring that
shareholders vote at the AGM on the directors’ remuneration
report.339 Yet, in just over one year since its inception, institutional shareholders have only voted against one existing pay
package — at GlaxoSmithKline.340 At the very least, shareholders should take advantage of their right to vote in order to embarrass executives. Indeed, in the U.S., embarrassed executives
have returned at least a portion of their astronomical pay. For
example, in 2002, the CEO of E*Trade Group, Inc., Christos M.
Cotsakos “returned $21 million in pay after shareholder anger
over his $80 million pay package boiled over.”341 In July 2002,
the CEO of Dollar General Corp., Cal Turner, Jr., returned $6.8
million which “he received as the result of financial results that
were later restated.”342 A spokesperson for the board of the
NYSE recently stated that it plans to recommend that federal
and state regulators pursue legal action against Richard
337. Id.
338. Toynbee, supra note 332.
339. See generally Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, (2002) SI
2002/1986. The shareholder voting requirement has been inserted as § 241A
of the Companies Act. Id. § 7.
340. Where’s the Stick?, supra note 109. Shareholders voted down a financial package that would have given chief executive Jean-Pierre Garnier £22
million for leaving the company before his contract had expired, despite a
significant fall in the company’s share price. See DTI Consults Over Compensation for Termination of Directors’ Contracts, COMPANY L. 24(9), 271–72
(2003). For more information, see also Glaxo Bows to Pressure over Executive
Pay, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2003, available at (discussing the revised pay policy
put forth by Glaxo seven months after its pay package was voted down at the
AGM).
341. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 108. For more information on Cotsakos’ compensation packages from E*Trade, see Troy Wolverton, E*Trade Pays Exec the
Big Bucks, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1017-895
842.html.
342. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 108–09.
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Grasso, the former chairman of the NYSE, unless he agrees to
return a substantial portion of his pay.343
The SEC also recently proposed “an increase in the power of
shareholders to nominate and appoint directors.”344 In effect,
this would allow shareholders to break through the “pay-forattendance” model of corporate leadership and put a stop to the
“you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours” phenomenon of executive remuneration.345 Such a proposal would be especially important in the U.K. where the reality is that “the non-executive
directors in an audit committee are appointed by the executive
directors who fix their salary.”346 In addition, it is a model for
the U.K. in the sense that the proposal shows a burden shift,
albeit a small one, towards placing the responsibility for controlling corporate governance in the hands of the shareholderowners.347 The U.K. government has not yet focused on the
shareholder’s responsibility. For example, in its 1999 Consultative Document, the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry
looked principally at the activities of U.K. companies, their remuneration committees, and their accountability to shareholders.348 Moreover, despite the 2002 Amendment to the Companies Law, which gave shareholders the right to vote at the AGM
on executive pay packages, GlaxoSmithKline is the sole example of shareholders taking advantage of the new amendment.349
343. Landon Thomas, Jr., Exchange Said to Want Move on Grasso Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at C1 (“John S. Reed, the interim chairman of the stock
exchange, has said that he expects Mr. Grasso to return as much as $150 million of his compensation.”).
344. SEC Proposal Rule, supra note 244. See also Where’s the Stick?, supra
note 109.
345. Hemraj, supra note 334, at 345–46. See also Fat Cats Feeding, supra
note 10, at 66 (“The ‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’ atmosphere of
company boardrooms has been recognized for decades.”).
346. Id. See also Press Release, Boards Dominated By Executives And Connected Directors, supra note 219. (“Over 75% of UK company boards are
dominated by executives and non-executives who are not independent, according to PIRC’s Annual Review of Corporate Governance published today.”).
347. See, e.g., Toynbee, supra note 332.
348. See DTI CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION (July
1999), supra note 90.
349. Heather Timmons, Glaxo Shareholders Revolt Against Pay Plan for
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at W1 (noting that the pay package was
voted against “by a slim margin of 50.72 percent to 49.28 percent”). Two large
institutional investors who voted against the proposal included Isis Asset
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Increased regulation regarding exorbitant pay is only the first
step toward curbing it. The next step is to place responsibility
in the laps of shareholders to be instrumental in ensuring that
such regulations succeed. Thus some of the focus of the U.S.
and the U.K. should be shifted toward the responsibility of the
shareholder.
In the end, it is evident that “a combination of a bear market,
some muted shareholder activism, and negative media commentary difficult to dismiss as mere Schadenfreude, [are necessary]
to effect change at the top.”350 Then, in a bull market, will executive compensation be a moot issue? There is a strong argument that in times of financial stability, apathy toward excessive compensation will increase. Some commentators are hopeful that change is afoot and that the balance in power between
executives and investors is changing.351 For instance, Carol
Bowie, director of governance research services at the Investor
Responsibility Research Center in Washington was optimistic
due to the success of recent shareholder lawsuits: “The shareholder-management relationship is going through a sea change,
with shareholders asserting their prerogative as owners of the
company. We went through a long period where shareholders
didn’t interfere with management. These lawsuits are not just
to recoup money anymore — they involve forcing companies to
change their practices.”352
At least one thing is clear, however, “[i]ncome inequality in
society has damaging effects. It reduces overall levels of wellbeing, creates a well-spring of resentment and helps trigger antisocial behaviors and outcomes.”353 In addition, a large pay differential between executives and lower-level employees is “bad
for the long-term performance of a company because it breaches
the trust between top management and the people who work for

Management, which manages £58.8 billion in assets ($95.4 billion) and California Public Employees’ Retirement System (known as CalPERS), one of the
world’s largest investors. Id.
350. Isles, supra note 128.
351. See generally Gibeaut, supra note 200; Morgensen, Shareholders Win in
Effort to Alter Pay, supra note 200, at C1, C10.
352. Morgensen, Shareholders Win in Effort to Alter Pay, supra note 200, at
C10.
353. Isles, supra note 128.
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them.”354 If “[o]rganizations are microcosms of wider society”355 it
will be necessary to continue compensation reforms even in a
bull market and during times of increased profitability. Another thing is also clear – increased regulations are the first
step in equalizing the playing field. The next step is for shareholders to exercise their ownership status and get in the game.
In both the U.S. and the U.K. it seems as though there is an
obvious inconsistency between “the outrage expressed in the
popular press and the lack of shareholder voice.”356 This can be
attributed to shareholder apathy or a penchant for simply selling one’s shares instead of fighting to substantiate change. In
addition, it is possible that the “free market system” for executives just does not work all that well.357 Most people are familiar
with the age-old saying: “to the victor, go the spoils.”358 By applying this tenet to the present day pay controversies, it is possible to reach the conclusion that perhaps, performance aside,
executives have earned a right to substantial compensation by
the nature of simply getting to be an executive. Perhaps this
way of thinking has remained ingrained in our corporate governance models — though recent developments show a shift
away from such shareholder apathy. Clearly, the governments
and regulating agencies in the U.S. and the U.K. are making
strides toward fixing the problem of astronomical executive pay.

354. Morgensen, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss is Paid So Much, supra
note 108, at section 3, at 1.
355. Isles, supra note 128.
356. Loewenstein, supra note 103, at 28.
357. See generally Bosses for Sale, supra note 121, at 57 (noting that the
market for executives is secretive, restricted, bad at price-settings and generally run by the head hunter firms).
358. Bartlett’s Quotations attributes this quote to William L. Marcy (17861857) during a speech in the United States Senate in January, 1832 (“They
see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victors belong the spoils of the enemy.”). See JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 419 (17th ed.,
Justin Kaplan ed. 2002).
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Yet, until shareholders speak with one, loud, unified voice, pay
will continue to spiral upward, despite increased government
regulation. Institutional investors, generally the largest and
most powerful owners of corporations in the U.S. and the U.K.,
have begun to flex their muscles and demand that executives
perform in accordance with how they are paid. However, at
least for now, it is still good to be the king.
Jaclyn Braunstein*
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